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Abstract
In this paper, a collective discrete choice model is presented for fe-
male labour supply. Both preferences of females and the intrahousehold
allocation process are econometrically identified. The model incorporates
nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. It is applied to Belgian micro-
data and is used to evaluate the 2001 Tax Reform Act. We find moderate
negative behavioural responses to the reform. The tax reform further
implies a Pareto improvement for most of the households in the sample.
Key words: collective household models, intrahousehold allocation,
labour supply, tax reform, identification.
JEL classification: D11, D12, J22.
1 Introduction
Usually, evaluations of the impact of tax reforms on employment and hours of
work are cast in the unitary framework. In this framework, it is assumed that
households, even if they consist of several individuals, behave as if they were sin-
gle decision making units. Recent examples of such tax reform evaluations are
Hoynes (1996) and Blundell et alii (1999). One important deficiency of the uni-
tary approach from a welfare economic point of view is that it is not able to say
anything on the intrahousehold allocation of welfare. Apps and Rees (1988) and
Brett (1998) have shown, however, that intrahousehold distributional issues can
in general not be ignored in normative welfare analyses. Another shortcoming of
the approach is that its theoretical implications seem to be overly restrictive. As
a consequence, they were repeatedly rejected when confronted with household
labour supply data (see Fortin and Lacroix, 1997 for some recent evidence).
A valuable alternative to the unitary approach is the collective approach to
household behaviour. This approach, which was introduced by Chiappori (1988,
∗Center for Economic Studies, University of Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Bel-
gium, e-mail: frederic.vermeulen@econ.kuleuven.ac.be. I would like to thank Denis Beninger,
Richard Blundell, Martin Browning, Andre´ Decoster, Franc¸ois Laisney, Nicolas Moreau, Erik
Schokkaert, Frans Spinnewyn and Marno Verbeek, as well as seminar participants in Antwerp,
Copenhagen and Leuven for useful comments. Financial support of this research by the re-
search fund of the University of Leuven (project OT 98/03) is gratefully acknowledged.
1
1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), takes account of the fact that multi-person
households consist of several individuals who have their own preferences. It is
assumed that these individuals are involved in an intrahousehold bargaining
process that results in Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations. The collec-
tive approach implies other behavioural restrictions than the unitary model (see,
e.g., Chiappori, 1988, 1992 and Browning and Chiappori, 1998). Contrary to the
unitary model’s restrictions, these testable implications of the collective model
turn out to be less restrictive (see references in Vermeulen, 2002a). Moreover,
the specific setting of the collective model allows to analyse the intrahousehold
welfare distribution under some additional assumptions (see Chiappori, 1988,
1992). Clear evidence of conflicting outcomes of the unitary and collective ap-
proach with respect to welfare evaluations of tax reforms is given in the different
contributions of Laisney (2002).
Gradually, many topics in the labour supply literature are translated into a
collective setting. Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002) derive collective restrictions and identification results with respect to
individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process. These stud-
ies do not take into account taxation and nonparticipation. In Blundell et
alii (2001), testable implications and identification results are derived for a
collective labour supply model that allows for both nonparticipation and un-
observed preference heterogeneity. Nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation are
dealt with in Donni (2001). Under some additional assumptions, identifica-
tion of a great deal of individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation
process is possible. The model, without nonparticipation, has been applied in
Moreau and Donni (2002).
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical studies that tackle both non-
participation and nonlinear taxation are the contributions in Laisney (2002). In
these studies, household labour supply is modelled as a discrete choice problem.
In other words, individuals are assumed to have the choice between a discrete
set of labour supply options. This approach, which is rather popular nowadays,
allows to incorporate very general nonlinear and nonconvex tax schemes (see,
van Soest, 1995, Bingley and Walker, 1997, Keane and Moffitt, 1998, Blundell et
alii, 1999 and Gong and van Soest, 2002, for some examples). In Laisney (2002),
individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process are identified,
in a piecemeal way, by means of both econometric estimation and calibration
techniques.
The aim of this paper is to present a collective and econometrically identifi-
able discrete choice model for female labour supply. The model is fairly general
in that it incorporates both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. The focus
on female choice behaviour is driven by the empirical observation that almost
all men in the sample we are using work full time. Their contractual working
hours typically reflect the number of hours that are worked in many economic
sectors. The intrahousehold allocation process and the preferences of women in
couples are completely identified by assuming that their preferences are egois-
tic and to some extent identical to those of single women. Egoistic preferences
are more restrictive than those assumed in Laisney (2002). In the latter study,
externalities within a household with respect to labour supply were allowed at
the cost of a piecemeal identification procedure. Alternatively, our assumption
is less restrictive than the assumption of equal preferences between singles and
individuals in couples that was made in Barmby and Smith (2001) to obtain
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complete identification. Moreover, their model does not take into account non-
linear taxation and nonparticipation issues.
It will be shown that the model presented here allows for richer behavioural
implications than the unitary model. In addition, it is able to say something
on who gets what in the household. Consequently, normative welfare analyses
can be done at the individual level, rather than at the household level. The
model is applied to Belgian microdata. The sample selection is for childless
individuals that are working or voluntarily unemployed. Students, self-employed,
involuntarily unemployed and retired people are excluded from the dataset. The
model will be used as a basis for an evaluation of the impact on employment,
hours and individual consumption of the Belgian 2001 Tax Reform Act. This
reform is to be implemented between the years 2001 and 2004 and implies some
important changes with respect to the current tax system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
economic model that is cast in a collective framework. In Section 3 a short
description of the current Belgian tax system is given. It also covers the main
features of the 2001 Tax Reform Act. Section 4 discusses the data and presents
model estimates. Tax reform simulation results are given in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The economic model
2.1 A sharing rule interpretation
We consider households that consist of two working age individuals (m and f)
and female singles. Labour supply of single men and of men in couples is
assumed to be fixed at full time working hours. Empirical evidence for this
assumption is given in Section 4. Note that the assumption is also supported
by Pencavel (1986) who concludes that male labour supply is rather insensitive
to changes in economic variables like wages and nonlabour income. We further
assume that preferences of individuals in couples are egoistic (see Chiappori,
1988). In other words, utility is derived only from own consumption and leisure.
Preferences of females are represented by the following well-behaved direct
utility function:
uf = vf
¡
cf , lf ,df
¢
, (1)
where cf denotes the female’s private consumption of a Hicksian aggregate com-
modity, lf is leisure and df is a vector of demographic characteristics (e.g., a
variable indicating whether the female is single or living in a couple, age and ed-
ucation level). Budget constraints for female singles and couples are respectively
equal to:
cf ≤ y + wf`f − τf
¡
wf`f , y,df
¢
(2)
and
cm + cf ≤ y + wm`m + wf`f − τ c
¡
wm`m, wf`f , y,dm,df
¢
= x, (3)
where wi is individual i’s gross hourly wage rate, `i is individual i’s labour
supply (`i = T − li, where T is total time available), cm is the male’s private
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consumption, y is nonlabour or other income and τf and τ c are tax functions
that capture the income tax that in general depends on earned incomes, other
income and demographic characteristics. Let us denote total household means
by x.
The core assumption in the collective approach is that individuals in cou-
ples choose Pareto efficient allocations (see Chiappori, 1988, 1992). It is a
well-known result that if preferences are of the egoistic type, then any Pareto
efficient allocation can be represented as a two stage budgeting process, where
household members first divide total household consumption among themselves.
In a second step, each individual maximizes her or his own utility subject to an
individual budget constraint. In our setting with fixed male labour supply, this
amounts to the following maximization problem:
max
cf ,lf
vf
¡
cf , lf ,df
¢
(4)
subject to
cf ≤ φ (x, z) ,
where φ is a function that determines the part of total household consumption
x that is transferred to the woman in the couple. Following Chiappori (1988),
let us call φ the sharing rule.1 In general this sharing rule will depend on a
number of variables z that influence an individual’s bargaining power in the
household. In Chiappori (1988, 1992), individual wages and other income act
as such variables. However, in a setting with nonlinear income taxation these
variables seem to be less adequate. In the empirical exercise we will make
use of a variable that already proved useful in the different contributions in
Laisney (2002). It captures the earning capacity of the female in the household.
The variable is defined as the difference between total household consumption
when the female works full time and total household consumption when she does
not participate in the labour market. This variable thus incorporates elements
related to her productivity and elements related to the nonlinear tax system.2
How can we now identify both preferences of females, as represented by
vf , and the sharing rule, as represented by φ, in an efficient way? Note that
in labour supply datasets, only total household consumption (net income) is
observed, and not the private consumption levels cm and cf . This rules out a
direct estimation of females’ preferences by means of the variables cf and `f ,
via a discrete choice model for instance.
One possibility to identify preferences and the sharing rule is to make use
of observed labour supply behaviour of single women, in addition to couples’
behaviour. Note that preferences of singles can easily be identified by means
of standard techniques, since the unitary approach is fully applicable to them.
In Barmby and Smith (2001), for example, preferences of individuals in couples
1Note that this representation of the sharing rule slightly differs from that in Donni (2001).
He makes use of virtual wages and nonlabour incomes which are a direct translation of the
sharing rule in collective labour supply models without taxation (see Chiappori, 1988, 1992).
Our representation will turn out to be very convenient in a discrete choice setting (cf. infra).
2Note that this variable also depends on the male’s productivity. It is for example easily
seen that, ceteris paribus, a female’s earning capacity decreases if her husband’s gross income
increases in a joint tax system with progressive marginal rates.
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are identified by assuming that their preferences equal those of singles. As will
be shown below, we do not have to go that far to identify both preferences and
the sharing rule. However, our assumption to obtain complete identification
is more restrictive than the approach followed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and
Donni (2001). The latter studies only make use of information in a couples
dataset to identify the sharing rule up to an additive constant and preferences
up to a translation.
2.2 Empirical specification of the model
We opt for a discrete choice model for female labour supply. This approach,
which was introduced by van Soest (1995), assumes that individuals can choose
between a limited number of labour supply options. The specific setting allows
to incorporate very general (e.g., nonlinear and noncontinuous) tax schemes.
The optimization problem consists of comparing the different utility levels as-
sociated with each of the available hours choices and choosing that one which
yields the highest utility.
Let us assume that females have J labour supply choices, each choice associ-
ated with a particular consumption level. Preferences of women are assumed to
be representable by a restricted version of the quadratic direct utility function
(see Stern, 1986). The utility that woman i derives from labour supply choice
j is given by:
ufij = v
f
³
cfij , l
f
ij ,d
f
i
´
+ εij (5)
= β``
³
dfi
´
·
³
`fij
´2
+ βc` · `fijcfij + βc · cfij + β`
³
dfi
´
· `fij + εij ,
where `fij = T − l
f
ij and εij is an unobserved preference component that is
assumed to be distributed as a type I extreme value random variable. The
preference parameters β``
³
dfi
´
and β`
³
dfi
´
are assumed to be heterogeneous
across individuals (among others, across single females and women in couples)
and are of the following form:
β``
³
dfi
´
= β``0 + β0``1d
f
i + υ``i (6)
and
β`
³
dfi
´
= β`0 + β0`1d
f
i + υ`i. (7)
Following Train (1998), an extra source of unobserved preference heterogeneity
across individuals is introduced via the disturbances υ``i and υ`i. These are
assumed to be mean zero normally distributed: υ``i v N
¡
0,σ2υ``
¢
and υ`i v
N
¡
0,σ2υ`
¢
.
As has been demonstrated by McFadden (1974), if the disturbances εij are
independent and identically distributed with type I extreme value distribution,
then the probability that individual i opts for labour supply choice k, given
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disturbances υ``i and υ`i, equals:
Pr (zi = k; υ``i, υ`i) = Pr
³
ufik > u
f
ij ,∀j 6= k; υ``i, υ`i
´
(8)
=
exp
³
vf
³
cfik, l
f
ik,d
f
i ; υ``i, υ`i
´´
PJ
j=1 exp
³
vf
³
cfij , l
f
ij ,d
f
i ; υ``i, υ`i
´´ ,
where zi is a random variable which indicates the choice made. The correspond-
ing unconditional probability equals:
Pr (zi = k) = Pr
³
ufik > u
f
ij ,∀j 6= k
´
=
Z Z exp³vf ³cfik, lfik,dfi ; υ``i, υ`i´´PJ
j=1 exp
³
vf
³
cfij , l
f
ij ,d
f
i ; υ``i, υ`i
´´f (υ``i)f(υ`i) dυ``idυ`i.
(9)
The likelihood function of this random parameters logit model equals:
logL =
nX
i=1
JX
j=1
dij log
Z Z exp³vf ³cfij , lfij ,dfi ;υ``i,υ`i´´PJ
k=1 exp
³
vf
³
cfik, l
f
ik,d
f
i ; υ``i,υ`i
´´f (υ``i)f(υ`i) dυ``idυ`i,
(10)
where dij is a binary variable which equals 1 if individual i has opted for labour
supply choice j and 0 otherwise. Estimates of the structural preference param-
eters and variances of unobserved preference components σ2υ`` and σ
2
υ` can be
obtained by means of simulated maximum likelihood methods (see Train, 1998).
Necessary elements for the application of a discrete choice model are the
individual consumption levels cfij associated with the different labour supply
choices. For female singles, these consumption levels are observed, given gross
wage rates (observed for participants, estimated for nonparticipants; cf. infra),
other income, individual characteristics and the tax system. As already men-
tioned, private consumption levels of women in couples are not observed. We
know, however, that the female’s private consumption at the j’th labour supply
choice cfij equals the share of total household consumption xij that is allocated
to her by means of the sharing rule φ. Let us assume that this sharing rule is
of the following form:
φ (xij , zi) = (1 + κ1 + κ2zi) · xij , (11)
where zi is the female’s earning capacity (cf. supra), and κ1 and κ2 are pa-
rameters that are to be estimated.3 Note that 0 < 1 + κ1 + κ2zi < 1. By
3Each variable that affects the bargaining power of the individuals in a household but does
not affect preferences can be taken up in the sharing rule (such variables are usually called
‘distribution factors’). See Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002) for some examples. It may be difficult, however, to find good distribution factors.
Contrary to Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), an index capturing divorce laws or laws
on alimony cannot be used for Belgium, since all regions have the same legislation on divorce
and alimony.
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making use of a dummy variable si which indicates whether woman i is single
(si = 0) or living in a couple (si = 1), we can define a budget constraint that is
simultaneously applicable to both single women and women in couples:
cfij = (1 + κ1si + κ2sizi) · xij . (12)
Substituting equation (12) for cfij in equation (5), we obtain the following ‘col-
lective’ female utility function with observable regressors:
ufij = β``
³
dfi
´
·
³
`fij
´2
+ βc` · `fij · (1 + κ1si + κ2sizi) · xij (13)
+βc · (1 + κ1si + κ2sizi) · xij + β`
³
dfi
´
· `fij + εij .
Application of this structural form in a random parameters logit model results
in the direct identification of the parameters β``
³
dfi
´
, βc`, β
∗
c`1 = βc`κ1, β
∗
c`2 =
βc`κ2, βc, β
∗
c1 = βcκ1, β
∗
c2 = βcκ2 and β`
³
dfi
´
. By means of these estimates,
we can derive the sharing rule parameters:
κ1 =
β∗c`1
βc`
=
β∗c1
βc
(14)
and
κ2 =
β∗c`2
βc`
=
β∗c2
βc
. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) imply two testable restrictions of this collective labour
supply model. The underlying idea is that the female’s private consumption can
only change via the sharing rule that allocates total household consumption to
both household members. Since the female’s private consumption occurs twice
in the given functional form, the sharing rule should twice have the same effect
on female consumption. Note that these restrictions are implied by the specific
functional form rather than by the collective approach as such.
It is also clear from equations (13), (14) and (15) that the equality of the
preference parameters βc` and βc for single women and females in couples is
necessary and sufficient for the identification of both female preferences and the
sharing rule. Without it, preferences and the sharing rule cannot be disentan-
gled. Nevertheless, there is much room for preference variation between singles
and women in couples with respect to the parameters β``
³
dfi
´
and β`
³
dfi
´
.
Marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure may well differ,
implying that the above assumption does not seem to be overly restrictive.
Apart from the above collective restrictions, the model implies the standard
unitary restrictions on the female’s utility function. These restrictions boil down
to the utility function (5) being (strictly) quasi-concave, monotone increasing
in consumption cf and monotone decreasing in labour supply `f . This implies
the following restrictions on the parameters for all
¡
cf , `f
¢
:
βc``
f + βc > 0 (monotonicity restriction w.r.t. consumption)
2β``
¡
df
¢
`f + βc`c
f + β`
¡
df
¢
< 0 (monotonicity restriction w.r.t. labour
supply)
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βc`
£
2β``
¡
df
¢
`f + βc`c
f + β`
¡
df
¢¤
− β``
¡
df
¢ £
βc``
f + βc
¤
> 0 (quasi-
concavity restriction).
Note that the last two restrictions depend on the unobserved disturbances
coming from the assumed preference heterogeneity across individuals. One pos-
sibility is a test of these restrictions for the expected value of the parameters
β``
¡
df
¢
and β`
¡
df
¢
.
3 The Belgian tax-benefit system and the 2001
Tax Reform Act
3.1 The Belgian tax-benefit system
In the empirical exercise, we will focus on a simplified tax-benefit system.
Firstly, information on many items that affect the tax liability of households
is lacking in the dataset that will be used. Examples of such items are contribu-
tions to private pension funds and capital redemptions due to mortgage loans.
Secondly, given the selected sample for the empirical exercise, we can safely
restrict attention to tax rules that are applicable to labour incomes and ignore
rules on incomes coming from, e.g., pensions and unemployment benefits. Also
child benefits do not have to be taken into account, since we focus on childless
households. We will only sketch the tax system that is applicable to the selected
sample. A more elaborate discussion of the Belgian tax-benefit system can be
found in Vermeulen (2002b).
The simplified tax scheme for the year 2000 that is used for the sample
of single women consists of four main components. These are (1) the social
security tax that is to be paid by employees, (2) the standard deductions, (3) the
marginal tax rate scheme and (4) the standard tax credits. The social security
tax is equal to a constant rate of 13.07% which is applied to gross labour income.
In a next step, standard expenses are deducted from labour income net of social
security contributions at a decreasing marginal rate ranging from 20% on the
first 4,165 euros to 3% on the bracket up to 55,470 euro. After these standard
deductions, the marginal tax rate scheme is applied to taxable labour income.
This marginal tax rate scheme consists of seven marginal tax rates, ranging
from 25%, applied to the first 6,400 euros, to 55% for the taxable labour income
above 61,230 euro. This operation results in the gross tax liability. Net tax
liability is obtained by subtracting the appropriate tax credits. The first tax
credit is that related to the basic exemption from income taxation. For a single,
this exemption equals about 5,200 euro. If taxable labour income is higher than
this exemption, a credit of about 1,300 euro is obtained. Next to this tax credit,
there is the tax credit related to family size. Since the households in the selected
sample are childless, this credit can be ignored in the empirical exercise. Finally,
there is a negative tax credit related to the temporary crisis surcharge.4 After
application of the other tax credits, an extra tax rate of 3% is applied to the
resulting tax liability.
The tax scheme for married couples differs from the above tax scheme in
two respects. Firstly, married individuals can make use of the so-called ‘marital
4The objective of this tax, which was introduced in 1993, was to generate extra means to
meet the budget and debt criteria of the Maastricht Treaty.
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quotient’ if some conditions are satisfied. This tax rule allows to shift a part
of the taxable labour income of one of the spouses to the other spouse. In our
simplified tax scheme, couples are allowed to make use of this marital quotient
if the taxable labour income of the spouse with the lowest earnings does not
exceed 30% of the joint taxable labour income. The part that is shifted to the
spouse with lowest earnings equals 30% of joint taxable labour income, minus
the own taxable labour income of that spouse. It has a maximum of about 7,500
euro however. A second main difference between the tax scheme for singles and
couples, is the basic exemption that is related to the tax credit. This exemption
equals about 4,140 euro for each spouse.
3.2 The 2001 Tax Reform Act
In August 2001, the new Tax Reform Act was proclaimed. This reform is to be
implemented over the period 2001 to 2004 and implies some relatively sweeping
changes of the current tax system. According to the government, the cost of
this reform is estimated at 3.25 billion euro or 10.7% of the amount generated
in 2001 by the personal income tax system net of the temporary crisis surcharge
(see Reynders, 2000). There are four main measures that are important for the
selected sample in the empirical exercise.
The first important change in comparison to the current tax system, is the
introduction of a refundable tax credit for the lowest labour incomes. A tax
credit of about 620 euro will be given to individuals with a labour income
(after deduction of social security contributions and deductions for professional
expenses) between about 3,700 and 12,400 euro. Eligible working individuals
that do not pay taxes or pay less taxes than this credit receive an extra income
equal to the difference between the credit and the taxes paid. Individuals that
participate in the labour market and earn less or more than the above boundaries
may be eligible to a reduced tax credit. According to the government, the
objectives of this in-work tax credit is to improve work incentives by making
work pay and to better the income position of some working individuals.
A second feature of the tax reform is the broadening of the middle tax
brackets and the lowering of the two highest marginal tax rates from 52.5%
and 55% to 50%. This measure is introduced to decrease the fiscal pressure on
respectively the middle and the highest incomes.
A third measure is that the tax exemption of married individuals and singles
will be equalized. In the current system, the tax exemption of married individ-
uals and, possibly cohabiting, singles differ. This exemption is to be brought at
the higher singles’ level.
Finally, the marital quotient will also be applicable to (unmarried) individ-
uals with a cohabitation contract.
4 Data and empirical results
4.1 Data
The data is drawn from the 1992 and 1997 Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of the
Center for Social Policy (University of Antwerp). This panel is representative
9
for the Belgian population and is primarily used for research of poverty issues,
the effectiveness of social security and the welfare distribution.
Two samples are selected for the empirical exercise. The first sample consists
of female singles without children, aged between 25 and 55 inclusive and who
are employed or voluntarily unemployed. Students, self-employed, unemployed
and retired people are excluded from the dataset. The second sample consists
of married or de-facto couples subject to the same sample selection as single
females. To minimize the impact of measurement error, individuals with wages
below or above the 1 and 99 percentiles of the wage distribution were also
excluded. The sample sizes are respectively 128 and 340 for female singles and
couples. Note that hourly gross wage rates are unobserved for individuals that
do not participate in the labour market. These wages are estimated by means
of Heckman’s two step estimation procedure (see Vermeulen, 2002b for more
detailed results).
In Tables 1 and 2 summary statistics on both selected samples are given.
Histograms on average weekly contractual hours of singles and individuals in
couples are given in Figures 1-4.5 As is clear from Figures 2 and 4, labour
supply of men is highly concentrated around 38 hours. Only a small fraction of
men have a contractual labour supply that deviates from this mode. Moreover,
there are no men who are not working for the selected sample. This fleshes
out the assumption made earlier that all men work full time. Labour supply of
women has a larger variance. Figures 1 and 3 clearly show that an important
fraction of the females do not participate in the labour market. This fraction
is higher for women in couples than for singles. A not unimportant fraction of
the females is working part-time, with peaks around 20 and 30 hours.
In the empirical exercise, we will assume that women have the following
discrete choice set: `f ∈ {0, 20, 30, 38}.6 For each of these weekly hours choices,
the corresponding household net income (i.e., total household consumption) is
calculated. This net income depends on the individuals’ gross hourly wages, the
household’s nonlabour income and the tax system.
5The sample of single males is subject to the same sample selection rules as those for single
females.
6Observed hours `f0 (see Figures 1 and 3) were allocated to the elements of the discrete
choice set as follows: `f = 0 if `f0 = 0; `
f = 20 if `f0 ∈]0, 25]; `f = 30 if `
f
0 ∈]25, 35] and
`f0 = 38 if `
f
0 > 35.
10
Table 1: Descriptive statistics single women (128 obs.)
Variable Mean Std.dev.
Dummy for labour market participation 0.94 0.24
Dummy 1 for schooling 0.43 0.50
Dummy 2 for schooling 0.32 0.47
Dummy 3 for schooling 0.16 0.36
Dummy 1 for region 0.30 0.46
Dummy 2 for region 0.19 0.39
Age 38.17 9.98
Number of years employed 15.10 9.59
Hourly gross wage rate 13.01 5.56
Contractual working hours per week 32.51 10.76
Weekly consumption based nonlabour income 57.92 55.07
Notes: Dummy for labour market participation: 1 = working. Dummy 1 for schooling: 1 =
secondary school (primary school benchmark). Dummy 2 for schooling: 1 = non academic
higher education. Dummy 3 for schooling: 1 = academic higher education. Dummy 1 for
region: 1 =Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Dummy 2 for region: 1 = Brussels
Capital Region. Monetary values are in euro.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics couples (340 obs.)
Variable Mean Std.dev.
Dummy for labour market participation wife 0.77 0.42
Dummy for labour market participation husband 1 0
Dummy 1 for schooling wife 0.54 0.50
Dummy 2 for schooling wife 0.25 0.44
Dummy 3 for schooling wife 0.06 0.24
Dummy 1 for schooling husband 0.57 0.50
Dummy 2 for schooling husband 0.24 0.43
Dummy 3 for schooling husband 0.08 0.28
Dummy 1 for region 0.24 0.43
Dummy 2 for region 0.04 0.21
Age wife 36.68 9.72
Age husband 38.63 9.70
Number of years employed wife 12.26 9.24
Number of years employed husband 18.47 10.89
Hourly gross wage rate wife 11.66 3.93
Hourly gross wage rate husband 14.65 5.88
Contractual working hours per week wife 26.76 15.94
Contractual working hours per week husband 37.99 2.06
Weekly consumption based nonlabour income 40.09 109.58
Notes: Dummy for labour market participation: 1 = working. Dummy 1 for schooling: 1 =
secondary school (primary school benchmark). Dummy 2 for schooling: 1 = non academic
higher education. Dummy 3 for schooling: 1 = academic higher education. Dummy 1 for
region: 1 =Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Dummy 2 for region: 1 = Brussels
Capital Region. Monetary values are in euro.
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Figure 1: Contractual working hours per week for women in couples
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Figure 2: Contractual working hours per week for men in couples
4.2 Empirical results
The second column of Table 3 reports unrestricted estimates of the model for
female labour supply (see equation (13)).7 According to a likelihood ratio test,
the conditional logit model (in other words, model without unobserved prefer-
ence heterogeneity with respect to
¡
`f
¢2
and `f ) cannot be rejected. Twice the
difference between the log likelihood of the restricted model and the log likeli-
hood of the unrestricted model equals 0.15. This test statistic is to be compared
to the critical value χ20.05 (2) = 5.99.
Let us now turn attention to the explanatory variables that are specific to the
collective approach. Two variables related to the sharing rule are significantly
estimated at the 5% significance level. Important with respect to the above
collective model, is that a Wald test cannot reject the restrictions (14) and (15).
The test statistic equals 2.74 and is lower than the critical value χ20.05 (2) = 5.99.
The unitary monotonicity and quasi-concavity restrictions were tested by check-
7The number of randomly drawn values for υ``i and υ`i in the simulated maximum likeli-
hood method equals 100 (cf. supra).
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ing whether they are satisfied for all observations in the sample.8 Contrary to
the above collective restrictions, results are not quite satisfactory. Monotonicity
with respect to consumption is not satisfied for the 38 hours choice. For 74%
of the checked labour supply choices, the marginal utility of labour is positive.
The concavity restriction is not satisfied for 94% of the checked labour supply
choices.9 Since these unitary rejections are problematic from a policy evalua-
tion point of view, we re-estimated the model with monotonicity with respect to
consumption and the collective restrictions imposed.10 The estimation results
are reported in the third column of Table 3. Quite interestingly, the number of
correctly predicted labour supply choices increased rather dramatically. More-
over, the imposed restrictions cannot be rejected by means of a likelihood ratio
test; the test statistic of 6.99 is lower than the critical value χ20.05 (3) = 7.82.
By means of the estimated coefficients and equations (14) and (15), we can
derive the sharing rule parameters κ1 and κ2. These are respectively equal to
-0.82341 and 0.00047 with corresponding standard errors of respectively 0.14595
and 0.00010. This implies the following sharing rule for the j’th hours choice of
individual i (see equation (11)):
φ (xij , zi) = (0.17659 + 0.00047 · zi) · xij . (16)
The share of total household consumption that is shifted to the woman in a
couple is thus positively, and significantly, related to her earning capacity. By
means of this sharing rule, we can estimate the private consumption going to
the woman, given her earning capacity and total household consumption (see
next section).
5 Policy simulations
In this section, we focus on both a positive and normative analysis of the Belgian
2001 Tax Reform Act. As has already been mentioned, a main advantage of
the collective approach is that it is able to identify gainers and losers of the
tax reform at the individual level, rather than at the household level. In other
words, intrahousehold distributional issues can be considered. We simulated
the tax reform by calculating the pre and post reform hours choices that are
most likely given the estimated model parameters and the household’s budget
set (i.e., net incomes for all four hours choices) for all single women and women
in couples. In general, two types of behavioural responses to the tax reform will
8The restrictions were tested for all four labour supply choices, taking into account the
corresponding consumption levels, for each observation (both singles and women in couples).
This amounts to checking the restrictions for 4× 468 = 1872 labour supply choices. Strictly
speaking, restrictions that involve the consumption level cf (notably, the monotonicity re-
striction with respect to labour supply and the quasi-concavity restriction) should be satisfied
for all nonnegative consumption levels.
9The model was also applied to the subsample of single women (to which the unitary
approach should be fully applicable). Monotonicity with respect to consumption was rejected
for the 38 hours labour supply choice. Monotonicity with respect to labour was rejected for
25% of the checked labour supply choices. Concavity was rejected in 87% of the cases.
10Monotonicity with respect to consumption is imposed by means of the linear restriction
βc = −βc` ·38. This implies that the collective restrictions can be imposed by the restrictions
β∗c1 = −β∗c`1 · 38 and β∗c2 = −β∗c`2 · 38 (cf. supra). Note that monotonicity with respect
to labour supply and quasi-concavity cannot be imposed without losing the flexibility of the
behavioural model.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates of the female labour supply model
Variable Unrestricted est. Restricted est.¡
`f
¢2
17.694 (3.106) 19.314 (3.116)
συ`` 0.263 (0.739) 0.107 (0.469)¡
`f
¢2× education dummy 1 2.324 (1.362) 2.045 (1.353)¡
`f
¢2× education dummy 2 0.084 (1.667) 0.123 (1.637)¡
`f
¢2× education dummy 3 4.573 (3.310) 4.174 (2.879)¡
`f
¢2× region dummy 1 0.733 (1.071) 0.918 (1.071)¡
`f
¢2× region dummy 2 -0.407 (1.881) -0.409 (1.859)¡
`f
¢2× dummy couple -11.937 (3.021) -12.591 (3.041)¡
x× `f¢ -2.759 (0.489) -3.114 (0.480)¡
x× `f¢× dummy couple 1.917 (0.550) 2.564 (0.494)¡
x× `f¢× dummy couple × earning capacity -5.58×10−7(7.94×10−7) -1.46×10−6(2.59×10−7)
cf 91.099 (22.523) 118.332 (18.252)
x× dummy couple -105.679 (33.190) -97.436 (18.775)
x× dummy couple × earning capacity 0.073 (0.063) 0.056 (9.82×10−6)
`f -246.156 (92.383) -330.379 (77.873)
συ` 3.523 (16.729) 2.450 (14.346)
`f× education dummy 1 -43.392 (50.534) -35.655 (50.407)
`f × education dummy 2 161.965 (76.989) 147.019 (75.105)
`f × education dummy 3 55.825 (179.637) 74.064 (153.146)
`f× region dummy 1 -20.215 (45.373) -26.916 (44.969)
`f× region dummy 2 51.272 (87.693) 50.672 (86.265)
`f× dummy couple 632.225 (174.151) 438.164 (79.691)
Log likelihood -288.026 -291.522
Correctly predicted observations 64% 79%
Notes: All parameter estimates and standard errors (between brackets) are multiplied by
1000. Education dummy 1: 1 = secondary schooling (primary schooling benchmark). Edu-
cation dummy 2: 1 = non academic higher education. Education dummy 3: 1 = academic
higher education. Region dummy 1: 1 = Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Re-
gion dummy 2: 1 = Brussels Capital Region. Dummy couple: 1 = couple (single woman is
benchmark). Earning capacity is the difference between the household’s disposable income
when the female is working full time and when she does not participate. Prediction of the
labour supply for an observation is obtained by selecting the hours choice with the highest
probability.
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come into play. The first effect is due to the fact that the tax reform implies an
expansion of all household budget sets. In other words, for each labour supply
choice, a higher net income is obtained after the tax reform. The impact of
the reform on the individuals’ labour supply and consumption will depend on
the standard interaction between income and substitution effects. This is not
the end of the story, however, since the reform may also imply a change of
the bargaining position of the individuals in couples, which is captured by the
sharing rule. This alteration entails an impact on both the magnitude and the
allocation of total household consumption to the household members. It implies
an extra behavioural effect on top of the standard effects that are incorporated
in the unitary approach.
Tables 4 and 5 give some summary statistics based on the pre and post re-
form simulations for respectively couples and single females. There are negative
behavioural responses to the tax reform: average labour supply is decreased by
about 6.32% for women in couples and by about 2.05% for single women after
implementation of the tax reform. Although this implies a decrease of gross
earnings, the private consumption of males and females in couples is increased
after the reform. The percentage increase of the women’s consumption, how-
ever, is on average greater than the males’, since the average bargaining power
of women (as measured by (1 + κ1 + κ2zi); cf. supra) is slightly increased after
the reform. This share, however, is not increased for all women, since some
women’s earning capacity is lowered after the reform. This is clearly seen in
Figure 5, where quite some observations are below the diagonal. Note that the
earning capacity is the result of a fairly complex interaction between the male’s
and female’s earnings and the tax system. It is also striking that the average
individual consumption of women (both before and after the reform) is much
lower than that of males and single women. This lower consumption is com-
pensated to some extent since women in couples work, on average, 7 hours less
per week than their single counterparts. Going somewhat further than a pure
positive description of the aggregate impact of the reform, under strong mea-
surability and interpersonal comparability assumptions the utility of women is
increased on average. This is the case both for singles and women in couples.
Table 4: Summary statistics couples pre reform versus post reform situation
Pre reform Post reform
Mean labour supply women 27.50 25.77
Mean gross earnings couple 889.13 871.00
Mean income tax 354.35 324.10
Mean income tax rate 0.399 0.372
Mean individual consumption women 168.87 172.71
Mean individual consumption men 409.62 417.90
Mean utility women 17.80 18.05
Mean consumption share women 0.2919 0.2924
Note: Monetary values are in euro per week, labour supply is in hours per week.
In Tables 6 and 7, simulated labour supply responses to the tax reform are
shown for women in couples and single females. As is clear from the tables,
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Table 5: Summary statistics single women pre reform versus post reform situa-
tion
Pre reform Post reform
Mean labour supply 34.18 33.48
Mean gross earnings 449.54 438.78
Mean income tax 168.28 155.11
Mean income tax rate 0.374 0.354
Mean individual consumption 334.21 336.62
Mean utility women 20.15 20.21
Note: Monetary values are in euro per week, labour supply is in hours per week.
bpi1
 bpi2  bpi1
.2 .3 .4 .5
.2
.3
.4
.5
Figure 5: Pre and post reform bargaining power women (pre reform: bpi1; post
reform: bpi2)
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responses are rather moderate. Most of the women in couples remain on the
status quo position (i.e., 94.7% are on the diagonal in Table 6). Women who
change their labour supply were mainly working full time before the tax reform.
Thirteen of these women opt for leaving the labour market after the reform. The
impact of the reform on the singles’ labour supply is also not very pronounced.
The percentage of singles that do not change their labour supply equals 93.8%.
Contrary to women in couples, no single woman leaves the labour market after
the reform.
Table 6: Pre reform versus post reform labour supply women in couples
0 20 30 38 Total
0 92 0 0 0 92
20 1 5 0 0 6
30 0 0 1 0 1
38 13 2 2 224 241
Total 106 7 3 224 340
Note: Rows are pre reform labour supply, columns post reform.
Table 7: Pre reform versus post reform labour supply single women
0 20 30 38 Total
0 10 0 0 0 10
20 0 7 0 0 7
30 0 4 7 0 11
38 0 3 1 96 100
Total 10 14 8 96 128
Note: Rows are pre reform labour supply, columns post reform.
Table 8 shows the numbers of gainers and losers of the tax reform for indi-
viduals in couples and singles. As is clear from the table, the tax reform implies
a Pareto improvement for the majority of the couples: both individuals’ utility
levels are increased after the reform.11 For 18 couples, the woman’s welfare is
increased, while the man’s welfare is decreased by the reform. In 29 cases, the
male is better off after the reform, while the female is worse off. There are no
households where both members are worse off after the reform. Note that this
kind of results at the individual level is impossible when modelling household
labour supply behaviour by means of a unitary model. Given the expansion of
the budget sets by the tax reform, it is hardly surprising that the majority of
the singles strictly gain from the reform.
Table 9 provides an inequality analysis with respect to private consumption
on an individualistic basis over both single females and individuals in couples.
The inequality measures used in this analysis belong to the generalized entropy
11The male’s utility level is represented by his individual consumption.
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Table 8: Gainers and losers of the tax reform
f(-) f(0) f(+)
m(-) 0 0 18
m(0) 0 0 0
m(+) 29 35 258
s(-) s(0) s(+)
0 39 89
Note: The variables m, f and s refer to respectively the utility level of males and females in
couples, and the single females’ utility level. The labels (-),(0) and (+) refer to a decrease,
a status quo or an increase in the corresponding utility level.
class. These measures are defined as follows (see Foster and Sen, 1997):
Iα (c) =
1
α (1− α)
1
n
nX
i=1
·
1−
µ
ci
µ
¶α¸
, α /∈ {0, 1} , (17)
where n is the number of individuals in the analysis, ci individual i’s private
consumption, c an n-vector of private consumption levels, µ the average private
consumption and α an inequality aversion parameter. If α equals 1 or 0, we
respectively have Theil’s entropy measure and Theil’s second inequality measure
or mean logarithmic deviation:
I1 (c) =
1
n
nX
i=1
ci
µ
ln
µ
ci
µ
¶
(18)
I0 (c) =
1
n
nX
i=1
ln
µ
µ
ci
¶
. (19)
Parameter α indicates the sensitivity of the associated inequality measure to
transfers at different parts of the distribution. It can be shown that all measures
with α < 2 favour transfers at the lower end of the distribution. A main
characteristic of the inequality measures in the generalized entropy class is that
they can be additively decomposed. In other words, these measures allow to
disentangle total inequality over individuals belonging to several groups into
inequality between these groups and inequality among the individuals in the
different groups. More specifically, the following can be shown for our three
groups case (single females is group S, females in couples is group F and males
in couples is group M):
Iα (c) = wSIα (cS) + wF Iα (cF ) + wMIα (cM ) + Iα (cS , cF , cM ) , (20)
where wI =
nI
n
³
µI
µ
´α
is the weight of group I in the analysis, nI the number
of individuals in I, µI the mean consumption of these individuals, cI the vector
of private consumption levels of the individuals belonging to group I and cI is
an nI -vector where each element equals µI .
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In the table below, inequality measures are given for α equal to -1, 0 and 1.
All three inequality measures indicate that overall inequality decreased after the
tax reform. This decrease is partly due to the decrease of the between group
inequality Iα (cS , cF , cM ). In addition, the inequality among single females
Iα (cS), among females in couples Iα (cF ) and among men in couples Iα (cM ) is
decreased after the tax reform.
Table 9: Inequality analysis pre and post reform situation
α = −1 α = 0 α = 1
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Iα (c) 110.48 106.67 94.12 91.55 84.91 82.97
Iα (cS , cF , cM ) 86.31 85.22 76.04 75.31 69.26 68.80
Iα (cS) 28.28 26.09 25.32 23.17 23.51 21.40
wS 196.60 198.62 219.66 219.66 245.43 242.93
Iα (cF ) 23.29 20.29 23.45 20.55 24.18 21.24
wF 691.11 687.64 390.17 390.17 220.27 221.38
Iα (cM ) 8.80 8.13 8.64 8.03 8.54 7.98
wM 284.92 284.18 390.17 390.17 534.30 535.69
Note: All figures are multiplied by 1000.
In the above inequality analysis, we focused on the distribution of the cake,
rather than on the size. However, we can also compare the pre and post reform
distributions of individual consumption by means of social evaluation functions,
which are functions of both mean consumption and an appropriate inequality
index (see, e.g., Lambert, 2001). Here, we focus on a social evaluation function
that is based on Theil’s normalized entropy measure:
W = µ (1− I∗1 (c)) , (21)
where I∗1 (c) =
I1(c)
lnn . Both an increase in mean consumption and a decrease in
inequality positively affect social welfare W . If we apply (21) to the pre and
post reform consumption distributions, we obtain a social welfare of respectively
295.37 and 300.65. Consequently, the tax reform seems to have a positive impact
on social welfare.12
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new methodology is presented to estimate a discrete choice
model for female labour supply. The model is cast in the collective setting
and is fairly general in that it allows for both nonparticipation and nonlinear
taxation. Identification of the model is obtained by assuming that some, but not
all, preference parameters of single women and females in couples are identical;
marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure may well differ.
By means of this, not very restrictive, assumption, both females’ preferences and
12Note that the government revenue is decreased rather substantially by the tax reform.
The analysis of the implications of this decrease on the provision of public goods and the
consequent impact on the individuals’ welfare go beyond the scope of this paper.
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the rule governing the sharing of total household consumption, as a function of
the earning capacity of the female, are econometrically identifiable. This feature
is rather important, since it allows to take into consideration intrahousehold
distributional issues, on top of standard interhousehold ones.
The model is applied to Belgian microdata and is used to evaluate the 2001
Tax Reform Act. This tax reform incorporates some important changes of the
pre reform tax system. Two types of theoretical restrictions are implied by
the specific model we use. A first restriction is linked to the collective setting
and is not rejected by the data. The model also implies some standard unitary
restrictions on the identified female preferences. The latter restrictions, however,
are rejected when confronted with the data. As to the sharing rule, the earning
capacity of females seems to have a significantly estimated positive impact on
the share in total household consumption that is shifted to the woman.
The impact of the tax reform on hours and participation is moderate, with
a reduction of about -6.32% of aggregate labour supply of females in couples
and -2.05% for single women. Further, the tax reform implies a strict Pareto
improvement for 76% of the couples in the sample. For most of the other
households, the tax reform is beneficial to one of the household members, while
the other is worse off. Note that such results, which refer to the intrahousehold
allocation of welfare, cannot be obtained in the standard unitary approach to
household labour supply.
Although the obtained results are not entirely satisfactory due to the re-
jection of some behavioural restrictions, the approach shows its relevance in
analysing changes in fiscal policy. The study has its limitations however. To
increase its empirical relevance, the model should be generalized so that it can
adequately deal with external effects and the presence of children in the house-
hold. In order to retain an econometrically identifiable model, preferences will
probably need to be restricted in one way or another (e.g., Beckerian caring pref-
erences, see Chiappori, 1988, 1992). A second limitation of the study at hand is
that it does not take into account elements of household public consumption. A
large share of total household means, however, is spent on goods with a public
consumption component, such as rent or heating. Two recent studies that deal
with household public consumption in a different way are Lewbel, Chiappori
and Browning (2001) and Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002). Finally, the
model does not incorporate household production (see Apps and Rees, 1997
and Chiappori, 1997). The simple dichotomy between market time and leisure
may be an inadequate assumption in modelling household labour supply. The
increasing availability of time budget studies may enhance the empirical mod-
elling of household labour supply incorporating household production.
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